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1. Introduction 
Institutional investors own more than two thirds of equity traded on the US stock market (Pensions 
and Investments, 2017) and play an important role in the governance of public corporations. Besides 
trading their stakes, shareholders can influence firms via a combination of public and private 
engagement, often labeled as shareholder activism. Public engagement involves submitting a 
shareholder proposal, initiating a proxy fight, starting a "just say no" campaign and it critically centers 
on the power to vote at shareholder meetings. Private engagement instead relies on private meetings 
with directors and executives to persuade the management to act in shareholders' interests, often using 
public engagement or share divestment as a threat. 
Institutional investors also own a large fraction of US corporate bonds. Although there is 
extensive evidence on the role of institutional investors as shareholders, we know very little about the 
impact of their debt holdings on their behavior. In this paper, we fill this knowledge gap and look at 
the effect of holding bonds as well as equity on institutional investors' engagement with a corporation.  
To identify the potential conflict of interest between debt and equity, we look at companies 
that are close to financial distress and thus face a wedge between the interests of shareholders and 
debt holders. In doing so, we follow the approach adopted by Becker and Strömberg (2012), who find 
that debt-equity conflicts can be affected by changes in managerial fiduciary duties and that the 
resulting changes in corporate behavior should only be visible for firms in financial distress. Focusing 
on the voting behavior of mutual fund families, if a fund family holds none of the corporate debt of a 
firm, we would expect its funds to vote so as to maximize the value of their equity stake. When the 
family debt fraction is positive, we would expect its funds to pay some consideration to the value of 
their debt stake, and therefore to vote considering the consequences for the value of both their equity 
and debt stakes in the firm. So, our first hypothesis is that a fund management company will be more 
likely to vote in the interests of debt holders in firms in which they own relatively more debt.  
To test whether debt holding by fund families affects the way they vote on shareholder 
proposals we focus on five corporate decisions where debt and equity have conflicted interests: 
dividend policy; equity issues and share repurchases; anti-takeover provisions; executive 
compensation; and restructuring activities such as assets sales, asset acquisitions or spinoffs. For each 
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of these corporate decisions, there is evidence in the literature that the interests of shareholders and 
debt holders may be in conflict with each other, particularly when firms are close to financial distress.  
To examine whether voting affects firm policy, we relate the extent to which institutional 
investors vote in favor of creditors to five corporate decisions namely capital expenditures; research 
and development; seasoned equity offerings; diversifying acquisitions; cash dividends and share 
repurchases. Our second hypothesis is that firms observing more pro-creditor votes will attach greater 
importance to creditors’ interests, leading them to act more in the interests of debt holders than 
shareholders.  
Our dataset covers the universe of US fund families investing in US listed firms over the 
2009-2013 period and has 12,327 firm-year observations containing 571 fund families. It is obtained 
by combining three datasets: the Morningstar Direct database, which contains data on the holdings of 
both debt and equity of all funds sold in the US; the data on fund voting from Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS); and the balance sheet information on all publicly traded firms with a 
positive level of debt from Compustat. 
In the analysis of the voting behavior of mutual funds, the dependent variable is an indicator 
whether the mutual fund votes in alignment with creditors on a specific proposal. The key 
independent variable is the fraction of debt held by the fund's family. As traditionally done, we 
include a number of control variables: a dummy variable that is set to one if ISS supports creditors for 
the proposal concerned; a set of firm characteristics (log size, leverage, market-to-book ratio and 
return on assets); the equity stake owned by the fund family; and the log of the number of funds in the 
fund family. We also include proposal type times year fixed effects.  
The basic result shows a positive correlation between family debt fraction and the propensity 
to vote with creditors. However, the economic effect is small. Intuitively, there is limited conflict 
between debt and equity when a firm is far from financial distress: what is in the interests of creditors 
is likely also to be in the interests of shareholders and changes in firm policy have a very small effect 
on the value of debt holders’ stakes. However, we would expect this conflict to be magnified close to 
financial distress, when corporate policies are likely to have a larger effect on the market value of 
debt. Therefore, we augment the analysis by including an indicator of financial distress. Our definition 
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of distress is based on the Bharath and Shumway (2008) distance to default measure. We define 
distress (0,1) in this case to be one if the firm’s default probability is at least 75% in the year 
concerned. We interact the family debt fraction with the financial distress indicator and find that the 
interaction term is statistically significant, positive and large in magnitude.  
The correlation is stronger when the vote is in alignment with management and/or the ISS 
recommendation but is still statistically significant even when creditors' interests are in conflict with 
these recommendations. As a placebo test, we also look at proposals for which we do not expect much 
conflict between debt and equity, such as director elections. In those instances we would not expect to 
find any effect of family debt fraction on voting policy. Our results confirm this prediction. Therefore, 
overall, the analysis of voting suggests that fund family debt holdings affect how fund families vote 
on these conflict proposals. 
What is the relevance of the voting channel for firm policy? To understand this we follow a 
two-step procedure. We first determine the total effect of joint debt-equity holdings on firm policy by 
relating the average debt equity fraction of institutional investors in a given firm to its policy. In the 
second stage, we measure the importance of the voting channel by relating the votes cast in favor of 
creditors on a given firm to its policy. We find that there is a significant effect of the voting channel 
on both firm investment and payout policy and that in terms of economic significance, the voting 
channel is responsible for about 20% of the link between the debt equity holdings of institutional 
investors in a firm and its investment policy and about 10% for payout policy.  
As a note of caution, the results described so far should be interpreted as simple correlations: 
mutual fund families with a long position in both corporate debt and equity tend to vote more in line 
with the interests of debt holders rather than shareholders, compared with families with only equity 
positions. In an attempt to move closer to the identification of a causality link between institutional 
debt holdings and corporate governance, we use an instrumental variable approach and a quasi-natural 
experiment. 
For our instrumental variable approach, we use the introduction of a new debt fund by a fund 
family as an instrument in our first stage models. Opening a new debt fund is likely to be driven by 
the desire to satisfy market demand rather than because a fund family wants to hold more debt in a 
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particular firm. The creation of a new debt fund mechanically increases the fraction of debt that the 
fund family holds. Furthermore, we show that the choice of debt securities by fund families when they 
introduce a new debt fund is virtually “passive” as on average of 86% of the time fund families invest 
in firms in which they already hold either debt or equity. When we instrument the family debt fraction 
and its interaction with distress using the new debt fund indicator, we confirm our basic findings: 
family debt fraction has a significant effect on the propensity to vote with creditors on proposals when 
firms are in financial distress. 
We also use mergers between fund families for a difference-in-differences test. For 
identification purposes, we use cases either in which the acquirer fund family holds no debt in the 
firm concerned but the target fund family does (acquirer has no debt and target has only debt) or vice 
versa (acquirer has only debt and target has no debt) but we exclude cases where both acquirer and 
target hold debt and equity in the same firm pre-merger. This allows us to identify more clearly the 
debt-equity position of the merged entity relative to the two initial firms resulting in a cleaner test. As 
these mergers are likely to be the result of strategic considerations at the fund family level, these serve 
as quasi-exogenous shocks to the debt equity ratio of fund families. When we take this approach, our 
basic results remain unchanged. While these results cannot alleviate all concerns of endogeneity, they 
offer some reassurance about the robustness of our findings.  
We conduct several further robustness checks. First, we consider alternative measures of 
financial distress. Our main measure of financial distress is the distance to default. We show that the 
results extend to the case in which we measure financial distress using the debt rating and also to the 
case where we measure financial distress at the industry level, based on the Opler and Titman (1994) 
definition.  
Second, in our main analysis we compute the fraction of corporate debt held by mutual fund 
families as the total value of debt held by a fund family over the total value of debt and equity held by 
the family. We obtain similar results if we use the number of debt funds over the total number of 
funds held by a mutual fund family. Third, we demonstrate that when we exclude funds that use credit 
default swap (CDS) contracts to hedge the credit risk of the debt securities they hold, that our results 
are unaffected. 
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Our contribution is to highlight that voting may be affected by joint debt-equity holdings and 
it is a channel through which these holdings affect policy. This is particularly important as 
institutional investors commonly hold both debt and equity in the same firm. Our findings suggest that 
debt holdings change the way institutional investors vote and generally engage with portfolio firms 
and thus should not be ignored when examining the governance role of institutional investors. 
There is a growing literature on the joint holdings of debt and equity of institutional 
investors.1 Most papers in this area focus on the impact of these joint holdings on target firm conduct. 
Chu (2018) shows that joint debt equity holdings influence payout policy while Chu, Nguyen, Wang, 
Wang, Wang (2019) suggest that these joint holdings allow easier resolution of financial distress. As 
regards investment policy, Yang (2019) and Chava, Wang and Zhou (2019) both show that joint 
holdings may have an effect on innovation and capital expenditure, respectively. Jiang, Li, and Shao 
(2010) examine the effect on loan interest rates when banks also hold equity in a given firm. What 
differentiates our paper is that we focus on the impact of these joint debt and equity holdings on 
voting behavior and the consequences of these votes. 
The most closely related paper to ours is Bodnaruk and Rossi (2016), who look at the effect 
of institutional investors holding both debt and equity in M&A targets. They examine the implications 
for the takeover premium, the returns that bondholders receive and the propensity of dual holders to 
vote in favor of the takeover bid. The scope of our paper is broader as it looks at the effects of 
institutional investors holding both debt and equity on voting on all types of firm policies not just 
M&A decisions. Furthermore, we show that the voting channel has implications for subsequent firm 
conduct while Bodnaruk and Rossi (2016) do not. Therefore, it extends and complements their work. 
Our paper has the following structure. Section 2 develops our hypotheses and reviews the 
related literature. In Section 3 we introduce our data and discuss our sample’s descriptive statistics. In 
Section 4 we present our empirical results on the effects of debt holdings on voting. Section 5 
                                                     
1 There are also papers that have looked at the impact of other types of institutional investor joint holdings 
(rather than debt and equity). For example, Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) study institutional investors that own 
equity in both the acquirer and the target and Azar, Schmalz and Tecu (2018) joint ownership of equity by 
institutional investors in competing firms affects how these firms compete in the product market. 
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examines the consequences of voting for firm policy. Section 6 presents our robustness tests. Section 
7 concludes.  
2. Hypotheses 
Institutional investors that hold equity in a firm can influence its corporate policy in two ways. They 
can publicly engage with the target firm, initiating a proxy fight and voting for their proposals at the 
shareholder meetings. Alternatively, they can privately persuade the management to act in their 
interests, using the possibility of public engagement or sale of their shares as a threat.  
The literature on institutional investor activism seems to indicate a large heterogeneity in 
activity and effectiveness across investors and over time. Wahal (1996) studies 356 public 
engagements by 9 pension funds between 1987 and 1993 and shows that pension funds are successful 
in changing the governance structure of targeted firms but their activity is not associated with a 
significant short-term or long-term improvement in either stock price or accounting measures of 
performance. Smith (1996) studies a comprehensive set of 51 public activism targets of CalPERS 
from 1987 to 1993 and finds more promising results: CalPERS seems to target underperforming 
companies and it has a high success rate (72%) of adopting governance structure changes. The paper 
shows that shareholder wealth increases for firms that adopt/settle and decreases for firms that resist.  
Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) examine the private correspondence between TIAA-
CREF and 45 firms it contacted between 1992 and 1996. The results indicate that TIAA-CREF 
reaches agreement with target companies more than 95% of the time; in more than 70% of the cases, 
the agreement reached without shareholders voting on the proposal (and even without shareholders 
knowing about TIAA-CREF involvement); 87% of the targets subsequently took actions to comply 
with these agreements. A similar study for the UK by Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2010) 
examines the activity of the activist fund Hermes UK Focus Fund, which was part of the British 
Telecom pension fund, over the period 1998-2004. The engagement of this fund tends to take a 
private rather than public form and seeks to restructure firms, focusing their activities, limiting 
acquisitions and capital expenditure, changing boards and altering financial policy. While there is no 
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positive market reaction to public notification of HUKFF's stake, there is a substantial share price 
reaction to engagement outcomes of between 3 and 4%.2 
The papers mentioned so far focus on the performance of very special funds. More recently, 
attention has shifted towards the general category of institutional investors. Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, 
and Matos (2011) show that international institutional investors are positively associated with firm-
level corporate governance in a large sample of firms from 23 countries during the 2003–2008 period. 
They find that firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly 
performing CEOs and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Iliev and Lowry (2015) 
emphasize that there is a large heterogeneity across mutual funds and find that over a quarter of the 
funds rely almost entirely on Institutional Shareholder Services recommendations, while other funds 
place little weight on them.  
We extend this literature by focusing not only on the equity holdings of institutional investors 
but also on their debt holdings. As a matter of fact, mutual fund companies often also hold debt in the 
same firms in which they hold equity. This may be through their debt only funds or their mixed funds 
that hold both debt and equity. What is the governance role (if any) of these debt holdings?  
First consider the public channel, the voting decisions. To measure the extent to which fund 
families hold debt as a share of the total holdings we define the variable family debt fraction as: 
 
 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜,௝,௧ ൌ ்௢௧௔௟ ௩௔௟௨௘ ௙௔௠௜௟௬ ሺ௜ሻௗ௘௕௧ ௛௢௟ௗ௜௡௚௦ ௜௡ ௙௜௥௠ ሺ௝ሻ௔௧ ሺ௧ሻ்௢௧௔௟ ௩௔௟௨௘ ௙௔௠௜௟௬ ሺ௜ሻௗ௘௕௧ ௔௡ௗ ௘௤௨௜௧௬ ௛௢௟ௗ௜௡௚௦ ௜௡ ௙௜௥௠ ሺ௝ሻ௔௧ ሺ௧ሻ  (1) 
 
If mutual fund companies have no debt in a firm, and their family debt fraction is zero we would 
expect them to vote so as to maximize the value of their equity share. However, when the family debt 
fraction is positive we would expect the mutual fund family to take into consideration the interests of 
their debt stake in the same firm and therefore to vote, thus evaluating not only the consequences for 
                                                     
2 These strategies are also adopted by hedge funds. For instance, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) use 
hand-collected data on 888 events launched by 131 activist hedge funds in 2001-2005 period to find that the 
announcement of hedge fund activism results in 5-7% abnormal return during the announcement window with 
no apparent reversal in the subsequent year. Klein and Zur (2009) compare the investment strategies of hedge 
and non-hedge funds. Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015) look at the effects of hedge fund activism on productivity, 
investment and labor policies. 
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the value of their equity stake in the firm but also the consequences for their debt stake. From this we 
get our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (Debt-holder governance): The greater the family debt fraction held by a given fund 
management company in a given firm, the greater the tendency of that fund management company to 
vote according to the interests of debt holders.  
 
Consider next the private engagement channel. If institutional investors hold only equity, we 
would expect them to not only vote in the interests of equity but to also push firm policy in the 
interests of equity through the direct communication channel. However, if institutional investors hold 
both a mix of debt and equity, then we would expect them to take the interests of debt into account to 
a greater extent when voting on firm policy and also directly communicating with firms.  
Therefore we would expect there to be two channels through which joint debt equity holdings 
affect firm policy. The first is through the voting channel and the second is through the private 
engagement channel. While we cannot observe the private communication channel, we can observe 
the voting channel, and therefore it is possible to test for its relative importance.  
If firms observe that institutional investors vote to a greater extent in the interests of creditors 
then we would expect firms to respond to this by acting more in the interests of creditors as well. 
Therefore our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2 (Impact of debt-holder governance): The greater the propensity of institutional investors 
to vote in favor of creditors on the proposals of a given firm, the more the firm will be managed in the 
interests of debt holders. 
We expect to detect the debt governance role of institutional investors in firms close to 
financial distress. This is because, when a firm is in financial distress, its decisions are likely to have 
large effects on the value of its bonds as well as the value of its shares. So, when holding a long 
position in a firm in financial distress, it is worthwhile for a fund family to coordinate the voting of its 
equity and debt funds, and invest resources to develop their own view on the firm’s strategy. 
Conversely, away from financial distress, bond prices are hardly affected by firms’ decisions. 
Therefore, there is no need to coordinate the voting decisions on debt and equity funds. 
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3. Data 
To conduct our analysis we merge together datasets from various sources. The first dataset consists of 
the holdings of U.S. fund families in U.S. listed firms, which allow us to calculate fund family debt 
fractions by all families in each firm. We gather data on the holdings of both debt and equity of all 
funds sold in the U.S. between 2009 and 2013 from the Morningstar Direct database, which includes 
not only funds that hold domestic securities but also global funds that hold a mixture of domestic and 
international assets.  
As we wish to relate fund family debt fractions to how fund families vote, the second set of 
data describes how mutual funds vote. U.S. mutual fund companies have been required by law to 
make public how they vote on proposals at the annual meetings of U.S. companies since 2003. We 
obtain data on fund voting from 2009 to 2013 from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). As we 
wish to relate votes cast in favor of creditors on firms to firm investment and payout policy, we 
require investment and payout data at the firm level. We gather this data on all publicly traded firms 
alive with any outstanding debt between 2009 and 2013 from Compustat. We only include firms with 
a positive amount of debt as these are the only firms that can possibly have a positive debt fraction 
and therefore allow us to test our hypotheses. We also require data available from CRSP and 
Compustat to be able to calculate the firm’s key financial characteristics such as market cap, Tobin’s 
q, leverage, return on assets (ROA), and default probability using the Bharat and Shumway (2008) 
distance to default model. 
We then match these three datasets together for the period 2009 to 2013 to give us a sample 
of 12,327 firm-year observations containing 571 fund families.3 Table 1 contains data on the fund 
family debt-equity holdings mix. Of the 571 fund families in our dataset, 8 families hold only debt, 
315 families hold only equity, and 248 families hold both debt and equity. Conditional on fund 
                                                     
3 Fund families have to hold equity to be able to vote on firm proposals at the annual meetings. We exclude 18 
firm-year observations in which fund families do not own equity but only hold debt in the firm. Including these 
observations does not qualitatively change our results. 
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families holding both debt and equity in a given firm, the average value of (debt and equity) holdings 
in each firm are $43 million and the average family debt fraction is 35%.  
To test whether the family debt fraction held by fund families affects the way they vote on 
corporate proposals we need to examine proposals where creditors and equity holders have conflicted 
interests. Otherwise there would be no relation between the family debt fraction and how fund 
families vote. We therefore use this criterion to select proposals that we examine. We read each 
proposal’s description to determine if the proposal is for or against the interests of creditors and 
categorize the proposals into five groups. 
The first group consists of proposals linked with dividend and share repurchases. We would 
expect that any proposal to increase special dividends or share repurchases is in the interests of 
shareholders but is against the interests of debt holders as there is now less cash in the firm which 
reduces the likelihood that debt holders will be paid. Likewise any proposal to decrease dividends or 
share purchases is classified as being in the interests of debt holders but against the interests of equity 
holders. Dhillon and Johnson (1994) confirm our priors by showing that bond prices fall significantly 
in response to large dividend increases and rise significantly in response to large dividend decreases 
while equity prices change significantly in the opposite direction. 
The second group of proposals concerns equity issuance. Equity issues bring more cash into 
the firm, which is good for debt holders as there is more money to pay them while at the same time it 
dilutes the holdings of equity holders and therefore may be contrary to the interests of equity holders. 
Eberhart and Siddique (2002), confirming this view, find that long-term equity returns are 
significantly negative and long-term bond returns are significantly positive following seasoned equity 
offerings.  
The third group of proposals concerns anti-takeover provisions. Takeovers are generally good 
for target shareholders. Takeovers however often involve the acquirer borrowing heavily to buy the 
target particularly in the case that the acquirer is a private equity company. Therefore, takeovers may 
be bad for debt holders. Seen from this perspective, any proposal that seeks to introduce anti-takeover 
provisions will reduce the likelihood of takeovers and therefore be bad for shareholders and good for 
creditors. In contrast, any proposal that seeks to remove anti-takeover provisions will increase the 
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likelihood of takeovers and therefore will be in the interests of shareholders and against the interests 
of debt holders. 
The fourth category of proposals concerns executive compensation. If a given proposal 
increases the sensitivity of management pay to firm performance then this is in the interests of equity 
holders as it aligns executive interests with shareholder interests. For this same reason, greater pay to 
firm performance sensitivity may be against the interests of creditors: for instance, management with 
an executive compensation that is fully aligned with equity may engage in risk shifting when close to 
financial distress. DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) show that approval of an executive stock option 
plan which increases the sensitivity of management pay to performance is accompanied by a 
significant positive stock reaction and a significant negative bond reaction which is consistent with a 
wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders. 
The fifth category of proposals concerns restructuring activities. Whether a particular 
restructuring activity is in the interests of debt holders or equity holders depends on the type of 
restructuring activity concerned and can be gauged by the stock market reaction to their 
announcement. The positive equity market reaction to asset sales in Clayton and Reisel (2013) and to 
spin-offs shown by Maxwell and Rao (2003) tell us that these are typically good for shareholders and 
bad for creditors. The negative market reaction to acquisitions of assets, indicates that the market 
interprets these as being bad for shareholders if there is overpayment or equity issuance. Lastly, in the 
case of liquidations of assets, these are generally good for creditors and bad for shareholders as they 
get little or nothing. 
Table 2 Panel A presents statistics on the set of proposals that we analyze grouped into the 
five categories discussed above. Our conflict proposal sample consists of 2,081 proposals. The 
average number of families voting within each of these categories of proposals is between 15 and 35 
families. Table 2 Panel B presents the statistics on our voting sample. Our voting sample consists of 
52,745 for or against decisions by fund families on 2,081 conflict proposals, and as a result is at the 
fund family-proposal level. For each of the proposals subject to a vote, we calculate a dummy variable 
vote with creditors, which is set equal to one if a given fund family casts more than 50% of the votes 
of its funds in favor of creditors for the given proposal and zero otherwise. In our voting sample, fund 
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families vote with creditors about 30% of the time. If we average fraction of votes cast in the interests 
of creditors across all fund families this is 25%. ISS support for creditors may affect how fund 
families vote on a given policy and the proportion of proposals for which ISS supports creditors is on 
average 30.1%. Panel B also presents the firm characteristics that serve as control variables when we 
analyze the relation between a fund family’s debt fraction and its voting policy.  
4. Empirical results 
In this section, we present our main findings on the governance role of debt holdings by institutional 
investors. First, we examine whether the family debt fraction held by a given fund management 
company in a given firm is correlated with the tendency of that fund management company to vote 
according to the interests of debt holders. Second, we consider how active and passive investors differ 
and whether the maturity of the debt holdings matters. Third, we adopt both instrumental variable and 
difference in differences tests as part of an identification strategy to proceed beyond simple 
correlations. 
4.1. Main findings 
We use the sample of 52,745 votes by fund families in support or against creditors’ interests on 2,081 
conflict proposals described above to analyze whether the fraction of debt held by fund families 
affects their propensity to vote with creditors. We regress our vote with creditors dummy on the 
fraction of debt held by fund families. In our regressions we include a number of control variables. 
First, we include a dummy variable that is set to one if ISS supports creditors for the proposal 
concerned. Second, we control for the characteristics of the firm being voted on. In particular, we 
control for the logarithm of its total assets, its leverage ratio, its market-to-book ratio, and its return on 
assets.4 Third, motivated by Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015), we control for whether the fund family 
has a large stake in the company concerned. We would expect that if the fund family has a trivial 
stake in the firm concerned it might not be worthwhile for the fund family to think much on the 
                                                     
4 In unreported regressions, we also control for the firm’s cash holding (cash/assets) and the results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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direction it wishes to vote; whereas, if its stake is large, it might be more compelled to reflect further 
on these issues. We therefore include a dummy variable, which we label big holding (0,1) that is one 
if the investment of the fund family in the firm concerned is above the size of its 75th percentile 
investment in the year concerned and zero otherwise. Fourth, we also include the log of the number of 
funds in the fund family as a control, as the size of the fund family may have a bearing on the 
propensity to vote with creditors. 
Table 3 Panel A models 1 and 2 show the results of regressing vote with creditors (0,1) on 
family debt fraction plus the controls defined above. Due to a large number of fixed effects, we use 
OLS regressions. We include fund family fixed effects, proposal type x year fixed effects and our 
standard errors are clustered at the family level. Consistent with our expectations, Model 1 shows that 
as the family debt fraction goes up the propensity to vote with creditors goes up as well. A one 
standard deviation increase (0.15) in the family debt fraction is associated with an increase of 0.3% in 
the probability of voting in the interests of creditors. This economic effect is small given that the 
unconditional probability of voting with creditors is 30%. 
If firms are in financial distress then small changes in firm policy may have serious 
consequences for the value of debt holders’ stakes in the firm. However, if firms are away from the 
bankruptcy threshold, changes in firm policy should have a much more muted effect on the value of 
debt holders’ stakes. As a result if fund families are voting on a firm in which they hold both debt and 
equity we would expect that the closer the firm is to financial distress the more the fund family would 
care about the value of their debt holdings in that firm. This discussion suggests that whether or not 
the firm being voted on is in financial distress may be material in determining the extent to which 
fund families vote with the interests of debt holders. We therefore augment the analysis of model 1 by 
including the influence of financial distress.  
To see whether financial distress affects the impact of debt fraction on voting, we interact 
family debt fraction with a dummy variable that equals one if the target firm is in financial distress in 
that year and zero otherwise. Our definition of distress is based on the Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
distance to default measure and we define a firm to be in distress if its default probability is at least 
75% in the year concerned. The results of our analysis are presented in Model 2. The interaction 
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between financial distress and family debt fraction has a statistically significant and positive effect on 
the propensity to vote with creditors. A one standard deviation increase in the family debt fraction is 
associated with an increase of 2.5% in the probability of voting in the interests of creditors when the 
firm is in financial distress (which represents an increase of 8.3 percentage points from the 
unconditional probability of voting with creditors). If we compare Model 2 with Model 1, it is clear 
that the impact of family debt fraction is greater when a given firm is in financial distress. This is 
consistent with the idea that, the closer fund families are to financial distress, the more they care about 
the interests of their debt holdings in firms.  
In Table 3 Panel A models 3 and 4, we replace the vote with creditors (0,1) variable with a 
continuous measure of the fraction of votes cast by funds within the family in support of creditors. 
The results are consistent with those in models 1 and 2. In model 4, the total value of family debt 
fraction (0.099) + family debt fraction × financial distress (0.1898) is 0.1997, which is significant at 
the 1% level. For distressed firms, we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the family 
debt fraction is associated with an increase of 3% in the fraction of votes in the interest of creditors. 
This effect represents an increase of 12 percentage points in the fraction of votes in the interest of 
creditors for the average distressed firm in our sample. For non-distressed firms, a one standard 
deviation in the family debt fraction is associated with an increase of 0.15% in the fraction of votes in 
the interests of creditors. This effect represents an increase of 1 percentage point in the fraction of 
votes in the interest of creditors for the average non-distressed firm in our sample. Therefore, a one 
standard deviation increase in the family debt fraction is associated with an increase of 3%-
0.15%=2.85% in the fraction of votes in the interest of creditors when the firm is in financial distress 
compared to non-financial distress. 
It might be argued that fund families would find it easier to vote with creditors on proposals 
where creditor interests align with management interests or ISS interests but find it harder to vote with 
creditors on proposals where voting with creditors involves voting against management or ISS. To test 
this idea we separate out proposals where creditors interests are either (a) aligned with the 
management interests or (b) opposite to the interests of management. Panel B presents the analysis of 
Panel A Model 2 except that we now separately analyze in Panel B Model 1 only proposals where 
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management interests are aligned with creditors interests and in Panel B Model 2 we separately 
analyze proposals where management interests are contrary to creditor interests.  
In Panel B Model 1, a one standard deviation increase in the family debt fraction is associated 
with an increase of 6.9% in the probability of voting in the interests of creditors when the firm is in 
distress (which represents an increase of 9.8 percentage points from the unconditional probability of 
voting with creditors). In Panel B Model 2, the same increase is associated with an increase of 2.6% in 
the probability of voting in the interests of creditors when the firm is in distress (which represents an 
increase of 29.2 percentage points from the unconditional probability of voting with creditors). 
Likewise, we then separate out proposals depending on whether creditors interests line up 
with ISS or not and these are presented in Panel C. In Model 1, a one standard deviation increase in 
the family debt fraction is associated with an increase of 1.9% in the probability of voting in the 
interests of creditors when the firm is in financial distress (which represents an increase of 2.1 
percentage points from the unconditional probability of voting with creditors/ISS). In Model 2, the 
same increase is associated with an increase of 0.8% in the probability of voting in the interests of 
creditors when the firm is in financial distress (which represents an increase of 26.5 percentage points 
from the unconditional probability of voting with creditors). 
Overall, the results in Panels B and C show that fund families find it easier to vote with 
creditors on proposals where creditors interests align with management interests or ISS interests but 
find it harder to vote with creditors on proposals where voting with creditors involves voting against 
management or ISS in which the economic effects are much larger. What is noteworthy when we look 
at our results is that there is still a statistically significant effect of the interaction of debt fraction with 
financial distress on the propensity to vote with creditors – even if voting with creditors requires fund 
families to vote against management or ISS. Therefore, overall, when firms are in financial distress, 
family debt fraction affects how fund families vote on these firms. 
Table 3 Panel D performs a placebo test. If our intuition concerning the impact of family debt 
fraction on voting policy is correct then we would expect that for proposals where debt and equity 
holders have no conflict that there will be no effect of family debt fraction on voting policy. To test 
this we take all proposals and remove all “conflict” proposals that have been used to perform the tests 
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in Table 3 Panels A, B, and C. Panel D shows that for all non-conflict proposals there is no link 
between voting propensities and family debt fraction, as one would expect. It might be argued that 
director elections are the non-conflict proposals where there is most clearly no conflict of interest 
between debt and equity holders. We therefore conduct further test using director election proposals 
alone (and for completeness we also run our analysis for the remaining non-conflict but non-director 
election proposals). Our results confirm that however we split our sample of non-conflict proposals 
that family debt fraction interacted with financial distress remains insignificant. 
Our tests in Table 3 assume that fund families make their voting decisions at the family level 
as most fund families have centralized governance offices that handle the voting and engagement 
functions for all of their funds.5 To examine the validity of this assumption we examine the average 
fraction of votes within a fund family that are different for the same proposal. Panel E of the same 
table shows that the percentage of funds that vote differently within a given fund family across all 
proposals is on average very small and typically under 2% which justifies our assumption. This is 
consistent with Keswani, Stolin, and Tran (2017), who find that funds within a family vote in the 
same direction almost 99% of the time. The same panel also shows that when we focus on less clear-
cut proposals where ISS recommends voting against management, we find that the level of 
disagreement within fund families increases. This evidence is consistent with Illiev and Lowry (2015) 
who find that disagreement within fund families goes up for more contentious proposals. Table 3 
Panel E also breaks down the percentage of funds that vote differently within a family according to 
whether families hold only equity or both debt and equity. As fund families that hold both debt and 
equity are likely to have funds with a greater number of viewpoints, we might expect these fund 
families to vote more differently across their funds than pure equity fund families and it confirms that 
this is indeed the case.  
                                                     
5 See for example BlackRock Investment Stewardship (July 2017). Alternatively Vanguard, Statement of 
Additional Information, (April 27, 2017), http://www.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/sai040.pdf (describing Vanguard’s 
Proxy Oversight Committee). 
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4.2. Additional analyses 
In this section, we present additional analyses to help understand the governance role of debt holdings 
by institutional investors. First we distinguish between active and passive investors to find out which 
type of investor is more engaged in debt-holder governance. Second, we consider whether the 
maturity of the debt holdings matters.  
4.2.1. Active vs. passive funds 
It might be argued that the fraction of stock owned by passive rather than active funds may 
significantly affect the governance of the firms concerned. To test whether this is the case in our 
dataset, we first use the names of each of the 6,874 funds in our database to manually classify them 
into passive versus active funds.6 We find that in our sample 6,096 (88.68%) of the funds are active 
while 778 (11.32%) are passive. For each family we calculate the debt fraction separately for the 
active funds and for the passive funds alone. Table 4 Panel A shows that the mean fraction of debt 
held by active funds in fund families that hold any debt is 39% while the mean debt fraction of 
passive funds (for fund families that hold some debt) is 13%. Panel B shows that while the debt 
fraction held by active funds plays a significant role on voting policy, in contrast the debt fraction of 
passive funds plays no significant role at all. These results suggest that the channel through which the 
debt holdings of institutional investors affect voting operates via active rather than passive funds. 
4.2.2. Debt maturity 
Funds may hold debt of a range of maturities. If funds hold more short-term debt in a given firm, then 
they may feel less compelled to influence that firm’s policy (particularly if the effects of changes in 
firm policy are only likely to be manifest in the longer term). We define bonds of less than five years 
to maturity as being short-term bonds and the remainder as medium and long-term debt. This allows 
us to calculate a family debt fraction using either just short-term debt or just the combined total of 
                                                     
6 To identify funds as passive we check for the presence of the following strings within the full fund title from 
Morningstar: Index, Idx, Indx, Ind, ETF, Russell, Passive, S&P, SandP, DOW, Dow, MSCI, Bloomberg, KBW, 
NASD, NASDAQ, NYSE, RUSS, STOXX, FTSE, Wilshire, Morningstar, Trkr, ProShares, 
DJUSHealthCare100, MidCap400, SmallCap600, QQQ, RydexMidCap, MarketTrack. We then run a manual 
check after this to check whether the observations classified as passive are valid. 
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medium and long-term debt. Table 5 Panel A shows that fund families hold significantly more mid 
and long-term debt rather than short-term debt with the mid and long-term debt fraction among 
families being 29% while the short-term debt fraction is only 23%. In Panel B when we examine the 
effect of the short-term debt fraction on voting policy and we find that it is insignificant while the 
effect of the fraction of mid and long-term debt does play a significant role. Therefore, our prior 
beliefs that holdings of short-term debt are less likely to be associated to debt-holder governance are 
confirmed in the data. 
4.3. Identification 
The results so far should be interpreted as simple correlations: mutual fund families with a long 
position in both corporate debt and equity tend to vote according to the interests of debt holders rather 
than shareholders. This correlation cannot be interpreted as causality because it could well be driven 
by omitted factors: for instance, higher degree of risk aversion by the fund management may lead to 
both joint investment in debt and equity, and a conservative choice of voting. In this section we adopt 
both instrumental variable and difference in differences tests to alleviate endogeneity problems.  
4.3.1. Instrumental variable analysis 
To move closer to the identification of a causal link between institutional debt holdings and 
corporate governance, we adopt an instrumental variable approach. If a fund family decides to launch 
a new debt fund, this may affect the debt-to-equity fraction that this family holds in its portfolio 
firms.7 Opening a new debt fund is likely to be driven by the desire to satisfy market demand rather 
than because a fund family wants to hold more debt in a particular firm. Therefore, it might be argued 
that the opening of a debt fund is a valid instrument to estimate the effect of changes in the family 
debt fraction on voting. We check our database each year to see when a fund family creates a new 
debt fund under its management. We are able to find 197 incidents when this happens. We then create 
our instrument, new debt fund (0,1), which equals one if a given fund family with an ownership stake 
                                                     
7 When a fund family opens a new debt fund, typically (in 58% of the cases) they do not close any other funds at 
the same time. In the other cases they close either a debt or an equity fund. 
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in the firm opens a new debt fund in the year concerned for the family level test, and zero otherwise. 
We then use this instrument in our first stage models. 
As a further cross check using these gathered incidents, we investigate whether fund families 
use these new fund openings to “actively” re-orientate their portfolios across securities. We find that 
this is not the case as on average 86% of the time investments that fund families make when they 
launch new funds in our sample are in the same firms in which they already own debt or equity 
securities, which suggests that the choice of the firms in which new funds invest is virtually “passive”. 
To test whether the introduction of new debt funds significantly affects the family debt 
fraction, we regress the family debt fraction on a set of control variables and a new debt fund dummy 
and its interaction with distress. As suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p.236), we instrument for both 
debt fraction and its interaction with distress (0,1) in two separate first stage models.8 The results of 
doing so are presented in Table 6 Models 1 and 2. Our first stage results show that new debt fund (0,1) 
interacted with distress has a statistically significant positive effect on both the interaction of the 
family debt fraction with distress. To gauge the strength of our new debt fund instrument and its 
interaction with the distress variable, the Cragg-Donald statistics of the excluded instrument (against 
the null that the excluded instrument is irrelevant in the first-stage regression) are clearly above the 
critical value for the Stock-Yogo weak identification test. We employ the methods outlined by Stock 
and Watson (2010) to test the validity of our instrument and ensure that the relevance condition is 
satisfied. 
We then use the family debt fraction and its interaction with distress instrumented as in 
models 1 and 2 to determine whether there is a significant effect of family debt fraction on voting 
policy, especially when firms are in distress. Model 3 shows that family debt fraction has a significant 
effect on the propensity to vote with creditors. A one standard deviation increase in the family debt 
fraction is associated with an increase of 3.1% in the probability of voting in the interests of creditors 
when the firm is in financial distress, which is similar in magnitude to that from the baseline model of 
2.5% reported in Table 3 Panel A Model 2. 
                                                     
8 Gopalan and Xie (2011) study conglomerates and industry distress and they instrument for conglomerate and 
conglomerate x distress separately in the first stage models. 
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4.3.2. Using fund family mergers as a quasi-natural experiment 
In this section we discuss a further identification test based on He and Huang (2017), which 
involves conducting a quasi-natural experiment using fund family mergers. As these mergers are 
unlikely to be motivated by fund family voting considerations or by the desire of a fund family to alter 
the debt fraction of a given firm, it might be argued that these mergers provide a quasi-exogenous 
change in the debt fraction of fund companies. We therefore conduct a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) regression analysis on how changes in debt fraction as a result of exogenous shocks from fund 
family mergers affect voting policies. We identify fund family mergers completed during 2009-2012 
from SDC’s M&A database in which the merging parties own debt or equity stakes in our sample 
firms before the merger and can be matched to fund families in Morningstar. We are able to find four 
fund family mergers: Invesco acquiring Van Kampen in 2009 (completed in 2010), Affiliated 
Managers acquiring Highbury Financial in 2010, PNC Funds acquiring Allegiant in 2010, and Wells 
Fargo Funds acquiring Evergreen Funds in 2010. We keep only firms in which the merging parties 
own debt or equity stakes before the merger. We also exclude firms in which fund families hold both 
debt and equity before the mergers, which allows us to more clearly identify the debt equity position 
of the merged entity relative to the two initial firms resulting in a cleaner test. To identify treated 
firms as a result of the merger, we require that (1) the acquirer holds only equity while the target holds 
only debt in the firm concerned in the year before merger completion or (2) the target holds only 
equity while the acquirer holds only debt in the firm concerned in the year before merger completion. 
We note that Chu (2018) excludes firms that are already treated by a merger between financial 
institutions but are later treated again by another merger between different financial institutions within 
three years. This does not apply in our sample because all of our mergers between fund families 
complete in 2010 and our debt and equity holdings are measured at the end of the calendar year. This 
procedure results in a sample of 27 treated firms involved in these four fund family mergers. Our 
voting sample has 19,173 observations meeting these criteria. We construct Treat (0,1) to be one for 
voting observations involving the treated firms and Post (0,1) to be one if the firm-year of the 
observation is after the merger. All regressions control for fund family fixed effects and (proposal 
type × year) fixed effects. Post (0,1) is subsumed by the year fixed effects.  
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We present our DiD results in Table 7. Model 1 shows that Treat (0,1) × Post (0,1) is 
statistically significant and model 2 shows that this effect is magnified under financial distress. 
Overall, the results indicate that changes in fund family debt holdings as a result of a merger with 
another family has a significant effect on voting policy. Although we cannot completely rule out 
endogeneity concerns, our estimates being consistent across different methodologies offer some 
reassurance about the robustness of our findings.  
5. The consequences of voting for firm policy 
Our results suggest that joint debt-equity holdings by institutional investors increase the likelihood 
that they will vote with creditors. In this section we turn to the economic implications of this result. 
Institutional investors can communicate with firms either directly or by voting. While we cannot 
generally observe the direct communication, we can see the voting behavior of mutual fund 
companies and therefore we can examine if these votes have consequences for firm policy. To shed 
light on the economic importance of voting as the channel through which debt equity holdings affect 
firm policy we follow a two-step approach. We first calculate the total impact of joint debt-equity 
holdings on policy, by directly relating the average joint debt-equity holdings across investors in a 
given firm to its policy. Then we calculate how much of this effect is due to the voting channel by 
relating votes cast in favor of creditors on that firm to its policy. This allows us to measure what 
fraction of the total impact of joint debt equity holdings on policy is attributable to voting. The 
evidence in the literature tells us that joint debt equity holdings affect firm investment and payout 
policy and therefore we focus below on policy choices in these two areas. 
5.1. Measures of firm policy  
We measure firm investment policy using four measures. We consider first capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) policy. The corporate finance literature argues that firms that are close to 
financial distress may experience debt overhang, which may dissuade them from taking positive NPV 
investments. We would expect firms receiving more creditor votes to act more in the interests of debt 
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holders and to therefore invest more in financial distress.9 The second policy we examine is seasoned 
equity offerings (SEO). If firms are close to financial distress, we would expect them to not want to 
issue equity because of the debt overhang problem. However, if firms recognize that their 
shareholders care about creditor interests as well, they will be compelled to act more in the interests of 
debt holders and be more prepared to issue equity in financial distress. As a result we expect to see 
more equity issuance in financial distress for firms that receive a higher fraction of votes in favor of 
creditors. To measure the two investment policies above, we scale the value of capital expenditure and 
SEO proceeds by book value of assets and set to zero missing values. The third policy we examine is 
non-core acquisitions.  Non-core acquisitions in financial distress can be understood as a hedging 
policy. Shareholders in financial distress do not want hedging rather they want risk shifting. 
Therefore, non-core acquisitions are not in the interests of equity holders. Conversely, hedging is in 
the interests of debt holders in financial distress and therefore non-core acquisitions are in the interests 
of debt holders. The non-core M&A variable is set to one if the firm makes an acquisition in which 
the target and the acquirer are not in the same two-digit SIC code during the year, and zero 
otherwise. 
We model payout policy using two measures namely dividends and repurchases. If more pro-
creditor votes signal to the firm the preferences of shareholders, we would expect these votes to lead 
to payout policy that is more aligned with creditors interests and therefore to lead to less dividends 
and less share repurchases. We follow a similar approach to our analysis of investment policy in that 
we include the same control variables and scale our payout variables by book value of assets. 
Table 8 Panel A presents the summary statistics of our sample firm characteristics. Our 
sample used for testing the impact of debt holdings on firm policy includes 12,327 firm-year 
observations. Overall the key statistics are comparable with other samples used in the literature. For 
example, our mean dividends scaled by assets is 1.02% which is close to 0.90% reported in Chu 
                                                     
9 Alternatively, we could focus only on large capital investment outlays where there are major investment 
injections as opposed to small investments that are likely to occur on a daily basis. We measure large capital 
expenditure, SEOs, dividends, and repurchases using a dummy variable approach in which the policy variable is 
set to one if the continuous variable is above the median across all firms in the year concerned. Although our 
results are qualitatively similar when we use the dummy dependent variables in either OLS or binary models, 
the dummy variable approach makes the interpretation of the economic effects difficult. 
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(2018). The mean institutional block ownership in our sample is 20%, which is comparable to the 
statistics in Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) that use the Thomson 13F database instead of Morningstar 
Direct.  
5.2. The direct effect of joint debt equity holdings on policy 
We need a firm-level variable that captures the extent to which the equity of a firm is jointly 
held with debt by institutional investors. We define the value weighted debt fraction of firm (j) in year 
(t) as the following: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௝,௧ ൌ
∑ ௏௔௟௨௘ ௢௙ ௙௔௠௜௟௬ ሺ௜ሻ ௗ௘௕௧ ௔௡ௗ ௘௤௨௜௧௬ ௛௢௟ௗ௜௡௚௦ ௜௡ ௙௜௥௠ ሺ௝ሻ ௔௧ ሺ௧ሻ்௢௧௔௟ ௩௔௟௨௘ ௢௙ ௔௟௟ ௙௔௠௜௟௜௘௦ᇲௗ௘௕௧ ௔௡ௗ ௘௤௨௜௧௬ ௛௢௟ௗ௜௡௚௦ ௜௡ ௙௜௥௠ ሺ௝ሻ ௔௧ ሺ௧ሻ௜ ൈ 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜,௝,௧ (2) 
When we relate the value-weighted debt fraction of a firm to its policies we use a number of 
control variables. These include the firm’s characteristics such as the log of the market value of 
equity, market-to-book ratio, return on assets, and leverage ratio. If the holdings of fund families in a 
firm are more concentrated, then we might expect those families to be able to exert more pressure on 
the firm than if the holdings of fund families in the firm concerned are more thinly spread. To control 
for this we include a control variable in our tests known as institutional block ownership, which is 
defined as the fraction of the firm that is held by block holders that hold more than 5% of the firm 
each. We also control for fund family characteristic such as the family’s big holding dummy and the 
number of funds in the family similar to those in the voting regressions but we value weight these 
measures across all families holding stakes in the firm during a year in the same manner as equation 
(2). In our firm policy regressions we include industry times year fixed effects and we cluster our 
standard errors by firm.  
The results of doing so are presented in Table 8 Panel B. Higher debt equity holdings lead to 
firms acting more in the interests of creditors and as a result investing more and raising more finance 
in financial distress and also paying out less. A one standard deviation increase in the family debt 
fraction (which is then value-weighted across families holding debt and/or equity in the firm) is 
associated with a 0.55% increase in capital expenditure, a 0.25% increase in SEO, a 0.49% decrease 
in the probability of making a non-core acquisition, a 0.11% decrease in dividends and a 0.15% 
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decrease in share repurchases. This is equivalent to a 13.8 percentage point increase in capital 
expenditure, a 14.1 percentage point increase in SEO, a 23.9 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of making a non-core acquisition, an 11.1 percentage point decrease in dividends and a 
10.5 percentage point decrease in share repurchases, respectively, from their corresponding sample 
mean. 
5.3. The importance of the voting channel on firm policy as a result of debt holdings 
Having established the total effect of joint debt equity holdings on policy, we are now in a 
position to examine how much of this total effect is attributable to voting policy. Table 8 Panel C 
relates the overall voting policy by fund families to firm investment and payout policy. To measure 
the fraction of votes in the interest of creditors on all conflict proposals, we calculate first the fraction 
of votes in the interest of creditors for each fund family across each conflict proposal category. We 
then average the fraction of votes in the interest of creditors for each fund family across all conflict 
proposal categories. After calculating the fraction voted in the interest of creditors for a given fund 
family in a firm in a given year, we calculate an equity-value weighted average fraction of votes in the 
interest of creditors across fund families in a firm in a given year. We use the same controls as in 
Table 8 Panel B and also interact the fraction of votes in support of creditors with the distress dummy. 
Overall the results show that the greater the fraction of votes in the interests of creditors in a given 
firm, the greater the extent to which the firm acts in the interests of debt holders in both its investment 
and payout policies. This clearly highlights that the voting channel plays an economically important 
role in the governance of firms.  
Comparing these findings in Panel C with the results in Panel B offers a rough estimate of the 
relative importance of public versus private engagement in the governance of firms. As previously 
estimated from Table 3 Panel A Model 4, a one standard deviation increase in the family debt fraction 
is associated with an increase of 2.8% in the fraction of votes in the interest of creditors. Using the 
coefficient estimates in Table 8 Panel C, such 2.8% increase in the fraction of votes in the interest of 
creditors is then associated with a 0.11% increase in capital expenditure, a 0.05% increase in SEO, a 
0.08% decrease in the probability of making a non-core acquisition, a 0.01% decrease in dividends 
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and a 0.01% decrease in share repurchases. Compared to the economic effects from Table 8 Panel B, 
those from Table 8 Panel C represent 21% for capital expenditure, 19% for SEOs, 17% for M&As, 
12% for dividends, and 8% for share repurchases, respectively. Overall, the economic significance of 
voting on corporate investment is about one fifth of the total effect of debt holdings on investment 
while the economic significance of voting on payout policy is one tenth of the total effect of debt 
holdings on payout. This suggests that corporate investment is more affected by voting, i.e. public 
engagement, while payout policy is mostly the result of institutional investors' private rather than 
public engagement.  
5.4. Additional analyses 
In section 4.2, we show that the channel through which the debt holdings of institutional 
investors affect voting is through active rather than passive funds and through funds holding long-
term debt rather than short term. In this section, we examine if firm policy is associated with debt 
holdings by active funds rather than passive and long-term debt holdings rather than short term. We 
find that firm policy is only affected by debt holdings by active funds and long-term debt holdings, 
not by passive funds’ debt holdings or short-term debt holdings.  
We follow the same method in section 5.3 to examine the importance of the voting channel on 
firm policy as a result of debt holdings by active funds and of long-term debt holdings. We find that 
the economic significance of voting on corporate investment is about one fourth of the total effect of 
debt holdings by active funds on investment while the economic significance of voting on payout 
policy is one fifth of the total effect of debt holdings by active funds on payout. Similarly, the 
economic significance of voting on corporate investment is about one third of the total effect of long-
term debt holdings on investment while the economic significance of voting on payout policy is one 
fourth of the total effect of long-term debt holdings by active funds on payout. Overall these results 
suggest that the voting channel plays a more important role on firm policy as a result of debt holdings 
by active funds or with long maturity. 
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6. Robustness tests 
In this section, we provide a number of robustness checks and present their results in Table 9. First, 
we adopt alternative measures of financial distress. Then, we try different measures of debt holdings 
at the fund family level. Next, we exclude funds that only hold debt or only hold equity, as may be 
different from the others. Finally, we consider the effects of non-financial firms and those funds 
without credit default swap contracts.  
6.1. Alternative measures of financial distress 
Our results show that the debt fraction of institutional investors influences voting and firm policy to a 
greater extent when the firm is in financial distress. For this purpose, the definition of financial 
distress is important. So far, we have classified firms as being in financial distress according to the 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) distance to default measure and we define distress (0,1) in this case to 
be one if the firm’s default probability is at least 75% in the year concerned. However, it is interesting 
to examine whether our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of financial distress.  
Our first alternative measure of financial distress follows Opler and Titman (1994) definition. 
Specifically, for each year, a three digit SIC code industry is in financial distress if the median sales 
growth is negative and the median stock return is below -30%. We define a firm as being in financial 
distress if the three digit SIC industry, to which it belongs, is experiencing financial distress in that 
year. As argued by Gopalan and Xie (2011), an advantage of using this distress measure is that these 
distress episodes are unexpected. Using this definition, 4.74% of the observations in our voting 
sample are in distress. As our second alternative measure of financial distress, we classify a firm in 
financial distress if its debt rating is CCC and below in the year concerned. For the 40,443 voting 
observations for which we can obtain ratings data, financial distress is restricted to 0.79% of the 
observations. Panel A of Table 9 presents the effect of our alternative definitions of financial distress 
on our results. It shows that when we interact debt fraction with our alternative definitions of financial 
distress, we still get a significant effect of this interaction on voting policy, which suggests that our 
findings are robust to variations in our definitions of financial distress. 
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6.2. Alternative measures of family debt fraction 
We currently calculate the family debt fraction as the total value of debt held by a fund family divided 
by the total value of debt and equity that it holds. An alternative way to measure the importance of the 
interests of debt for the fund family concerned is to calculate the fraction of funds that are not pure 
equity funds in a fund family but are either pure debt funds or are mixed equity and debt funds: both 
these types of funds should care about the interests of debt relative to pure equity funds. We calculate 
the value of equity and debt owned by each fund in each year across all firms to categorize each fund 
into debt, equity or mixed. We classify a pure equity (debt) fund as having at least 95% of its holdings 
in equity (debt); while we consider all other funds as mixed. In the database of 21,630 fund year 
observations, we have 4,413 pure debt funds (20.54%), 15,164 pure equity funds (70.11%) and 2,023 
(9.35%) mixed funds. Panel B of Table 9 presents our results where we use the proportion of debt 
funds in the family as the debt fraction, with this proportion being either the proportion of debt and 
mixed funds or the proportion of pure debt funds. We find that voting policy is still significantly 
affected by the debt fraction interacted with financial distress as was the case in our main voting 
results. These findings indicate that our results are robust to the way we measure the family debt 
fraction. 
6.3. Families holding both debt and equity 
It might be argued that our results are driven by fund families with no debt. For example, if these fund 
families exhibit voting behavior that is strongly in the interests of equity, this may help to validate our 
findings. To test this we exclude these fund families from our sample. The results are reported in 
Table 9 Panel C. We find that the value weighted debt fraction interacted with distress still has a 
significant effect on voting policy even when we focus only on fund families that hold both debt and 
equity. 
6.4. Excluding financial companies 
As financial companies operate in different ways to non-financial companies, we examine the effect 
of excluding financial companies from our analysis. The results of doing so are presented in Table 9 
Panel D. We find that there is no material effect of excluding financial companies on the link between 
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the debt fraction of fund families and voting policy. This indicates that our voting analysis is 
unaffected by excluding financial companies.  
6.5. Excluding funds that hold credit default swap (CDS) contracts 
If fund families hold CDS contracts that hedge the credit risk in their debt positions, they may be less 
likely to vote in the interests of debt and to push firms to act in a manner that favors creditors. The 
fact that our main results are robust to the inclusion of holdings of CDS contracts suggests that we 
may be underestimating the role of debt holdings in influencing voting and firm behavior. As a further 
check to explore if removing these CDS holdings has any influence on our results, in Table 9 Panel E 
we exclude fund-years in which funds hold CDS contracts and find barely noticeable changes.10 
7. Conclusion 
Focusing on the effect of debt holding of mutual funds on voting and showing that this voting affects 
firm policy are the key contributions of this paper. This is an important extension to the existing 
literature, which has focused so far on the equity holdings of these investors.  
Using data on the universe of US-based mutual funds, we find that it is common for mutual 
fund families to hold also the corporate debt of firms in which they have equity stakes. In these cases 
the fund family is more likely to vote in the interests of debt holders when considering a proposal in 
which there is a conflict between debt and equity, such as dividend policy, equity issues and share 
repurchases, anti-takeover provisions, executive compensation, and restructuring activities, when 
close to financial distress. Interestingly, we find no significant difference in voting patterns across 
mutual fund families when examining proposals that are associated to no conflict of interest, like 
director elections. 
Institutional investors can influence firms via voting or through direct engagement. We test 
the relative importance of the voting channel as the channel through which debt equity holdings affect 
firm policy. While the literature has shown that there is a link between the debt equity holdings of 
                                                     
10 We have 285 funds holding CDS positions in our database. It should be recognized that despite excluding 
fund-years where funds hold CDS contracts that we still have the same number of fund family-firm-year 
observations without this exclusion, because this does not cause any fund families to drop out. 
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institutional investors and firm policy, our contribution is to show that an important part of this link is 
due to voting. Our findings indicate that debt holdings change the way institutional investors vote and 
generally engage with portfolio firms. Hence, they should not be ignored when examining the 
governance role of institutional investors. 
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Table 1: Fund family debt holding statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 12,327 firm-year observations during the 
2009-2013 period. For all U.S. publicly traded firms in Compustat with positive leverage, we collect 
from Morningstar Direct the debt and equity holdings of all U.S. funds on U.S. publicly traded 
companies. We report the mean, median, the standard deviation and the lower and upper quartiles of 
the time-series average debt and equity holdings across mutual fund families in individual firms. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
Number 
of 
families 
Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std dev 
Value of debt and equity 
holding in each firm (mil $US) 571 22.9505 1.6760 0.4240 7.3525 194.9690 
Debt fraction in each firm 571 0.0784 0.0000 0.0000 0.0735 0.1824 
 
Conditional on family holding both debt and equity in the firm 
Value of debt and equity 
holding in each firm (mil $US) 248 43.1757 9.1374 2.2248 28.5720 149.0736 
Debt fraction in each firm 248 0.3468 0.3424 0.2419 0.4497 0.1625 
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Table 2: Voting proposal and voting sample statistics 
 
Table A presents statistics on the full sample of proposals we examine. We break down proposals into 
those that are less likely to result in a conflict of interest between debt holders and equity holders 
(non-conflict proposals) and those that are more likely to entail a conflict of interest between debt 
holders and equity holders (conflict proposals). We further breakup the category of conflict proposals 
by proposal type. We calculate for each type of proposal, the number of proposals, the average 
number of fund families voting within this proposal type and the fraction of proposals for which ISS 
agrees with management’s recommendation. Table B presents the statistics on the sample of 52,745 
votes on 2,081 conflict proposals. For each of the proposals subject to a vote, we calculate a dummy 
variable vote with creditors, which is set equal to one if a given fund family casts more than 50% of 
the votes of its funds in favor of creditors for the given proposal and zero otherwise. Our voting 
sample consists of 52,745 decisions by fund families in support or against 2,081 conflict proposals.  
 
Panel A: Proposal statistics 
Proposal types Number of proposals 
Average number of 
fund families voting 
Proportion of 
proposals for which 
ISS = management 
1. Conflict proposals 2,081 25.76 0.84 
    
1.1. Dividends and share repurchases 20 33.52 0.96 
1.2. Equity issuance 364 20.06 0.85 
1.3. Anti-takeover provisions 468 35.15 0.82 
1.4. Executive compensation 1,029 25.49 0.83 
1.5. Restructuring activities 200 14.82 0.90 
    
2. Non-conflict proposals 72,393 25.77 0.89 
    
2.1. Director election proposals 51,883 26.90 0.90 
2.2. Other non-conflict proposals 20,510 26.99 0.85 
    
Total 74,474 25.77 0.88 
 
Panel B: Voting sample statistics 
 N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std dev 
Fund family vote with creditors (0,1) 52,745 0.3038 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4599 
Fraction of votes with creditors 52,745 0.2490 0.0000 0.0000 0.3333 0.4302 
ISS recommends with creditors (0,1) 52,745 0.3012 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4588 
Market value of equity ($US billion) 52,745 14.2583 3.9566 1.1164 13.9527 28.0553 
Market-to-book 52,745 1.6184 1.3135 1.0387 1.8505 0.9545 
Leverage 52,745 0.2322 0.2145 0.1166 0.3228 0.1550 
ROA 52,745 0.1350 0.1232 0.0629 0.1899 0.1018 
Firm age 52,745 28.2406 22.1014 12.5041 39.3671 20.9717 
Institutional block ownership 52,745 0.2164 0.1786 0.0962 0.2769 0.3258 
Big holding (0,1) 52,745 0.4285 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4949 
Number of funds in the family 52,745 4.8073 3.0000 1.0000 6.0000 5.2453 
Financial distress (0,1)  52,745 0.0556 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1622 
Family debt fraction  52,745 0.0393 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1511 
Conditional on family holding debt       
Family debt fraction  7,136 0.2945 0.1489 0.0459 0.4901 0.3096 
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Table 3: The effects of debt holdings on voting 
 
In this table, we report OLS regressions modelling fund families voting in favor of proposals that are in the interest of creditors. Our voting sample consists of 
52,745 voting outcomes by fund families in support or against 2,081 conflict proposals, and as a result is at the fund family-proposal-firm-year level. In Panel 
A models 1 and 2, the dependent variable equals one if a given fund family casts more than 50% of the votes of its funds in favor of creditors for the given 
proposal concerned and zero otherwise. In Panel A models 3 and 4, the dependent variable equals the fraction of votes cast by funds in a family in favor of 
creditors for the given proposal concerned and zero otherwise. In Panel A we use all proposals. In Panel B we separate all proposals into those where creditor 
interests are aligned with the interests of management or not and report the coefficients of the main independent interaction variables from Panel A model 2. 
In Panel C we separate all proposals into those where creditor interests are aligned with the interests of ISS or not. In Panel D we perform placebo tests by 
using proposals that are less likely to exhibit a conflict of interests between debt holders and equity holders. The key independent variable family debt fraction 
is the sum of investment in bonds across all funds of the family in a firm in a year divided by the sum of investment in bonds and equity across all funds of 
the family in the firm in the year. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All regressions control for fund family fixed effects and (proposal type × 
year) fixed effects except for Panel D Model 1 in which we do not control for proposal type as there is only one proposal type “director election”. Standard 
errors are clustered by fund family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: All proposals 
 Dependent variable =  Family voting in the interest of creditors (0,1)  
Dependent variable =  
Fraction of votes in the interest of creditors 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Family debt fraction 0.0200** 0.0308 0.0170* 0.0737 0.0133* 0.0608 0.0099 0.3132 
Financial distress (0,1)   -0.0263** 0.0148   -0.0131 0.2455 
Family debt fraction × financial distress (0,1)   0.1681*** 0.0071   0.1898*** 0.0008 
ISS voting in the interest of creditors (0,1) 0.7872*** 0.0000 0.7876*** 0.0000 0.6895*** 0.0000 0.6897*** 0.0000 
Firm size 0.0024* 0.0961 0.0026* 0.0918 0.0046** 0.0186 0.0048** 0.0154 
Market-to-book -0.0021 0.2449 -0.0019 0.3202 -0.0033 0.1969 -0.0040 0.1430 
Leverage 0.0129 0.2678 0.0122 0.3995 0.0020 0.9032 -0.0101 0.6639 
ROA 0.0296 0.2522 0.0280 0.2846 0.0418 0.1644 0.0414 0.1761 
Firm age -0.0034* 0.0979 -0.0032 0.1130 -0.0061* 0.0913 -0.0062* 0.0828 
Institutional block ownership -0.0008 0.8446 0.0002 0.9526 -0.0038 0.5593 -0.0030 0.6375 
Big holding (0,1) -0.0009 0.6832 -0.0014 0.5290 -0.0004 0.8512 -0.0007 0.7538 
Number of funds in the family -0.0098*** 0.0000 -0.0098*** 0.0000 -0.0104*** 0.0000 -0.0103*** 0.0000 
Intercept 0.1881*** 0.0000 0.1863*** 0.0000 -0.6874*** 0.0000 -0.6857*** 0.0000 
N 52,745   52,745   52,745   52,745  
Adjusted R2 0.8447   0.8448   0.8011   0.8011  
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Panel B: Proposals grouped by whether creditor interests are aligned with management’s 
 Creditor interests = Management interests  
Creditor interests ≠ 
Management interests 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Family debt fraction × distress (0,1) 0.4641** 0.0366 0.1751** 0.0412 
Other controls as in Panel A Model 2 Yes   Yes  
N 13,384   39,361  
 
Panel C: Proposals grouped by whether creditor interests are aligned with ISS’s 
 Creditor interests =  ISS interests  
Creditor interests ≠  
ISS interests 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Family debt fraction × distress (0,1) 0.1303*** 0.0000 0.0513** 0.0206 
Other controls as in Panel A Model 2 Yes   Yes  
N 12,659   40,086  
 
Panel D: Placebo tests on voting policy using non-conflict proposals 
 Director election  Proposals  
Non-director 
election proposals  
All non-conflict  
Proposals 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value  Coeff p-value 
Family debt fraction  
× distress (0,1) 0.0280 0.1952 0.0078 0.2780 0.0282 0.2410 
Other controls as in Panel A 
Model 2 Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 1,395,566   553,248   1,948,814  
 
Panel E: Voting dispersion across funds within a family 
Percentage of votes in which: 
Families 
holding debt 
and equity 
Families 
holding equity 
only 
z test for 
difference in 
proportions 
Funds within a family vote differently on the 
same proposal 
 
(N=7,136) 
2.00% 
(N=45,609) 
0.96% 6.48
*** 
Funds within a family vote differently on the 
same proposal conditional on ISS 
recommendation to vote against management 
(N=462) 
4.16% 
(N=4,070) 
1.77% 3.47
*** 
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Table 4: The effects of debt holdings on voting by active vs passive funds 
 
This table presents the analysis of fund debt holdings on voting for active and passive funds. Panel A 
shows the summary statistics for the family debt fraction depending on whether the fund holding the 
firm’s debt is active or passive. Debt fraction at the family level for active (passive) funds is the 
proportion of investment in bonds by active (passive) funds in total investment in bonds and equity 
for all funds in the family. Panels B presents the effects of active or passive family debt holding on 
voting under financial distress using the regressions in Model 2 of Table 3 Panel A. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of debt holdings 
 Active funds  Passive funds  Difference 
 N Mean [Median]  N 
Mean 
[Median]  
t-stat 
[z-stat] 
Family debt fraction   52,745 0.0482 
[0.0000] 
 52,745 0.0032 
[0.0000] 
 56.53*** 
 
Family debt fraction conditional 
on family debt holding 
6,561 0.3915 
[0.2496] 
 1,350 0.1294 
[0.0708] 
 41.36*** 
[24.42***] 
 
Panel B: The effects of family debt holdings on voting policy 
Coefficient and p-value for  
family debt fraction × distress (0,1)  Active funds   Passive funds 
 N Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
All proposals 52,745 0.1840*** 0.0045 0.1730 0.2313 
      
Creditor = management interests 13,384 0.1643** 0.0423 0.0436 0.6970 
Creditor ≠ management interests 39,361 0.1930** 0.0162 0.0466 0.5190 
      
Creditor = ISS interests 12,659 0.1179*** 0.0000 0.0921 0.5390 
Creditor ≠ ISS interests 40,086 0.0909** 0.0104 0.0727 0.5930 
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Table 5: The effects of debt holdings on voting by debt maturity 
 
This table presents the analysis of fund debt holdings on voting for debt of varying maturity. Panel A 
shows the summary statistics for the family debt fraction depending on whether the fund’s debt 
holding is short term (less than five years to maturity) or mid or long term (at least five years to 
maturity). Debt fraction at the family level for short term (mid and long term) debt is the proportion of 
investment in short term (mid and long term) bonds in total investment in bonds and equity for all 
funds in the family. Panel B presents the effects of debt maturity on voting under financial distress 
using the regressions in Model 2 of Table 3 Panel A. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of debt holdings 
 Mid and long term   Short term  Difference 
 N Mean [Median]  N 
Mean 
[Median]  
t-stat 
[z-stat] 
Family debt fraction   52,745 0.0317 
[0.0000] 
 52,745 0.0121 
[0.0000] 
 27.77*** 
 
Family debt fraction conditional 
on family debt holding 
5,876 0.2869 
[0.1313] 
 2,824 0.2281 
[0.0788] 
 8.49*** 
[11.68***] 
 
Panel B: The effects of family debt holdings on voting policy 
Coefficient and p-value for  
family debt fraction × distress (0,1)  Mid and long term   Short term 
 N Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
All proposals 52,745 0.1715*** 0.0007 0.0211 0.6223 
      
Creditor = management interests 13,384 0.1665** 0.0122 -0.0156 0.8584 
Creditor ≠ management interests 39,361 0.1781*** 0.0013 0.0501 0.2773 
      
Creditor = ISS interests 12,659 0.1567*** 0.0000 0.0457 0.2845 
Creditor ≠ ISS interests 40,086 0.1364** 0.0121 0.0383 0.5472 
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Table 6: The effects of debt holdings on voting using an instrumental variables approach 
 
We report the results of a two-stage regression: the first stage models the determinants of the fund family 
debt fraction; the second stage models the voting outcomes. In models 1 and 2, we estimate the first stage 
OLS effect of the creation of new debt funds on debt fraction and its interaction with distress following 
Woodridge (2002). In model 3, we present the second stage using the family debt fraction and its 
interaction instrumented from the first stage in Models 1 and 2. The second stage dependent variable is 
vote with creditors (0,1), which equals one if a given fund family casts more than 50% of the votes of its 
funds in favor of creditors for the given proposal concerned and zero otherwise. Models 1 and 2 control 
for (industry × year) fixed effects. Model 3 controls for fund family fixed effects and (proposal type × 
year) fixed effects. New debt fund (0,1) equals one if a given fund family with an ownership stake in the 
firm opens a new debt fund in the year concerned. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Standard errors are clustered by fund family.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 First stage  Second stage 
 Model 1 
Family debt  
fraction 
 
Model 2 
Family debt fraction 
× Distress (0,1) 
 
Model 3 
Vote with 
creditors (0,1) 
 Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
New debt fund (0,1) 0.0171*** 0.0003 0.0000 0.9200   
New debt fund (0,1) × distress (0,1) 0.0830 0.3564 0.0971** 0.0301   
[Family debt fraction]’     -0.0515 0.3604 
[Family debt fraction × distress (0,1)]’     0.2088** 0.0239 
ISS voting with creditors (0,1) 0.0011 0.7596 0.0000 0.9830 0.7884*** 0.0000 
Firm size 0.0123*** 0.0000 0.0004 0.4741 0.0030 0.1049 
Market-to-book -0.0015 0.3936 0.0004 0.3807 -0.0016 0.3985 
Leverage 0.1358*** 0.0000 0.0065 0.4471 0.0314* 0.0726 
ROA -0.0509** 0.0178 -0.0015 0.5504 0.0174 0.4235 
Firm age -0.0060*** 0.0045 0.0005* 0.0919 -0.0028 0.1976 
Inst block ownership -0.0036 0.5290 -0.0014 0.7012 0.0019 0.8551 
Big holding (0,1) 0.0235*** 0.0000 0.0021* 0.0671 0.0017 0.5295 
Number of funds in the family -0.0056*** 0.0000 -0.0006* 0.0678 -0.0100*** 0.0000 
Distress (0,1) 0.0034 0.8377 0.0625*** 0.0000 -0.0942*** 0.0080 
Intercept -0.0822*** 0.0003 -0.0059 0.1056 0.1777*** 0.0000 
F-statistic of excluded instrument 27.92  23.70    
N      52,745  52,745  52,745  
Adjusted R2 0.0670  0.0872  0.8463  
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Table 7: The effects of debt holdings on voting using fund family mergers    
 
This table reports difference-in-differences (DiD) regression analysis on how changes in debt fraction 
as a result of exogenous shocks from fund family mergers affect voting and firm policies. We identify 
fund family mergers completed during 2009-2012 from SDC’s M&A database in which the merging 
parties own debt or equity stakes in our sample firms before the merger and can be matched to fund 
families in Morningstar. We are able to find four fund family mergers: Invesco acquiring Van 
Kampen in 2009 (completed in 2010), Affiliated Managers acquiring Highbury Financial in 2010, 
PNC Funds acquiring Allegiant in 2010, and Wells Fargo Funds acquiring Evergreen Funds in 2010. 
We keep only firms in which the merging parties own debt or equity stakes before the merger. We 
also exclude firms in which fund families hold both debt and equity before the mergers. To identify 
treated firms as a result of the merger, we require that (1) the acquirer holds only equity while the 
target holds only debt in the firm concerned in the year before merger completion or (2) the target 
holds only equity while the acquirer holds only debt in the firm concerned in the year before merger 
completion. We construct Treat (0,1) to be one for voting observations involving the treated firms and 
Post (0,1) to be one if the firm-year of the observation is after the merger. All regressions control for 
fund family fixed effects and (proposal type × year) fixed effects. Post (0,1) is subsumed by the year 
fixed effects. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by fund 
family. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable = Vote with creditors (0,1) 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Firm size -0.0008 0.5984 0.0004 0.7879 
Market-to-book -0.0026*** 0.0044 -0.0029*** 0.0049 
Leverage 0.0105 0.1863 -0.0050 0.6148 
ROA 0.0685*** 0.0000 0.0605*** 0.0000 
Firm age -0.0039* 0.0630 -0.0042** 0.0478 
Institutional block ownership 0.0014 0.8409 0.0027 0.7139 
Big holding (0,1) 0.0051 0.2104 0.0044 0.2757 
Number of funds in the family -0.0124* 0.0665 -0.0124 0.0649 
ISS voting with creditors (0,1) 0.7984*** 0.0000 0.7992*** 0.0000 
Treat (0,1)  0.0410 0.1077 0.0237 0.3146 
Treat (0,1) × Post (0,1) 0.0309** 0.0232 0.0187** 0.0446 
Distress (0,1)   -0.0287*** 0.0006 
Treat (0,1) × Distress (0,1)   0.0424 0.1779 
Treat (0,1) × Post (0,1) × Distress (0,1)   0.2187** 0.0249 
Intercept 0.2009*** 0.0000 0.1975*** 0.0000 
N   19,173  19,173  
Adjusted R2 0.8427  0.8430  
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Table 8: The importance of voting channel on firm investment and payout policy 
 
In this table, we report OLS regressions modelling firm investment and payout decisions in a given year. Panel A presents the summary statistics of our 
12,327 firm-year sample described in Table 1. In models 1-5, the dependent variables are different firm investment and payout variables defined in the 
appendix. In Panel B, the key independent variable value weighted debt fraction is the value weighted debt fraction by all families in a firm in a year with the 
weight being the family’s investment (sum of both debt and equity) in the firm. Debt fraction at the family level is the proportion of investment in bonds in 
total investment in bonds and equity for all funds in the family. Panel C relates the overall voting policy by fund families on all conflict proposals to firm 
policy in each firm-year. To measure the fraction of votes in the interest of creditors on all conflict proposals, we calculate first the fraction of votes in the 
interest of creditors for each fund family across each conflict proposal category. We then average the fraction of votes in the interest of creditors for each fund 
family across all conflict proposal categories.  After calculating the fraction voted in the interest of creditors for a given fund family in a firm in a given year, 
we calculate an equity-value weighted average fraction of votes in the interest of creditors across fund families in a firm in a given year. This measure can 
then be related to the different types of firm investment and payout policy. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All regressions control for (industry 
× year) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
 N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std dev 
Market value of equity ($US billion) 12,327 14.6256 1.5320 1.0384 12.9148 27.4401 
Market-to-book 12,327 1.5884 1.3394 1.0079 1.7707 0.9675 
Leverage 12,327 0.2341 0.2230 0.1010 0.3236 0.1492 
ROA 12,327 0.1352 0.1149 0.0522 0.1559 0.0925 
Firm age 12,327 28.7210 23.0959 11.7616 37.7726 17.3709 
Institutional block ownership 12,327 0.2038 0.1803 0.0693 0.3040 0.2652 
Capital expenditure 12,327 0.0396 0.0216 0.0053 0.0493 0.0574 
SEOs 12,327 0.0179 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0824 
M&As 12,327 0.0204 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1415 
Dividends 12,327 0.0102 0.0007 0.0000 0.0104 0.0306 
Repurchases 12,327 0.0139 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064 0.0418 
Value weighted debt fraction held by fund families 12,327 0.0499 0.0000 0.0000 0.0269 0.1514 
Conditional on family holding debt in the firm-year        
Value weighted debt fraction conditional on family debt holding 3,851 0.2597 0.1831 0.0335 0.3962 0.2943 
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Panel B: The effects of debt holdings on firm investment and payout policy 
 
 
Model 1 
Capital expenditure  
Model 2 
SEO  
Model 3 
Non-core M&A  
Model 4 
Dividend  
Model 5 
Repurchase 
 Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Value weighted debt fraction 0.0141*** 0.0048  0.0067 0.2730  0.0115 0.4610  -0.0100*** 0.0000  -0.0122*** 0.0000 
Value weighted debt  
      fraction × Distress (0,1) 0.0361
** 0.0109  0.0167** 0.0428  -0.0322** 0.0229  -0.0074*** 0.0018  -0.0096*** 0.0056 
Firm size -0.0005 0.1339  0.0008 0.1683  0.0041*** 0.0000  -0.0003 0.2266  0.0000 0.9027 
Market-to-book 0.0005 0.3174  0.0029*** 0.0000  -0.0013 0.2426  0.0027*** 0.0000  0.0041*** 0.0000 
Leverage 0.0124*** 0.0001  0.0074 0.1081  0.0146 0.0878  0.0055 0.0103  -0.0001 0.9756 
ROA 0.1069*** 0.0000  -0.0802*** 0.0000  0.0687*** 0.0000  0.0585*** 0.0000  0.1093*** 0.0000 
Firm age -0.0045*** 0.0000  -0.0114*** 0.0000  -0.0011 0.5438  0.0033*** 0.0000  0.0011** 0.0149 
Institution block ownership -0.0014 0.6114  0.0049 0.3901  -0.0129** 0.0346  -0.0038** 0.0418  0.0047** 0.0227 
Big holding (0,1) 0.0031*** 0.0091  -0.0003 0.8622  0.0047 0.1841  0.0003 0.6828  0.0042*** 0.0000 
Number of funds in family -0.0031*** 0.0053  -0.0098*** 0.0000  0.0004 0.9120  0.0020** 0.0100  0.0087*** 0.0000 
Distress (0,1) -0.0037** 0.0219  -0.0154** 0.0184  -0.0132*** 0.0003  -0.0040*** 0.0000  0.0002 0.8117 
Intercept 0.0353*** 0.0000  0.0610*** 0.0000  0.3829** 0.0393  -0.0028 0.8088  -0.0377*** 0.0000 
N  12,327   12,327   12,327   12,327   12,327  
Adjusted R2 0.3621   0.0397   0.0186   0.0742   0.1621  
 
 
 
 
  
42 
 
 
 
Panel C: The effects of voting on firm policy 
 
 
Model 1 
Capital expenditure  
Model 2 
SEOs  
Model 3 
Non-core M&As  
Model 4 
Dividends  
Model 5 
Repurchases 
 Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Fraction of votes in the interest of creditors  0.0008 0.2778  0.0018*** 0.0008  -0.0216** 0.0387  -0.0005 0.8139  -0.0019** 0.0257 
Fraction of votes in the interest of 
       creditors × Distress (0,1) 0.0405
*** 0.0000  0.0170*** 0.0000  -0.0291** 0.0302  -0.0049** 0.0279  -0.0039** 0.0128 
Firm size 0.0000 0.6711  0.0001** 0.0275  0.0040*** 0.0000  -0.0004 0.1246  -0.0001 0.6966 
Market-to-book 0.0000 0.7832  0.0002*** 0.0001  -0.0013 0.2120  0.0028*** 0.0000  0.0021*** 0.0000 
Leverage 0.0037*** 0.0000  0.0003 0.4159  0.0181 0.0285  0.0031 0.1079  -0.0015 0.2303 
ROA 0.0309*** 0.0000  -0.0076*** 0.0000  0.0700*** 0.0000  0.0594*** 0.0000  0.0552*** 0.0000 
Firm age -0.0004** 0.0126  -0.0005*** 0.0000  -0.0018 0.3386  0.0032*** 0.0000  0.0004** 0.0418 
Institution block ownership -0.0010** 0.0212  0.0002 0.5266  -0.0125* 0.0503  -0.0038* 0.0562  0.0024** 0.0137 
Big holding (0,1) 0.0005* 0.0912  -0.0002 0.1050  0.0049 0.1688  0.0004 0.5418  0.0022*** 0.0000 
Number of funds in family -0.0003 0.4248  -0.0005*** 0.0001  0.0002 0.9481  0.0017** 0.0263  0.0041*** 0.0000 
Distress (0,1) -0.0016** 0.0168  -0.0007 0.2287  -0.0145*** 0.0000  -0.0036*** 0.0000  0.0004 0.3424 
Intercept 0.0051** 0.0276  0.0027*** 0.0000  0.3865** 0.0373  -0.0009 0.9389  -0.0176*** 0.0000 
N  12,327   12,327   12,327   12,327   12,327  
Adjusted R2 0.4962   0.2042   0.0203   0.0735   0.1622  
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Table 9: Robustness tests 
 
This table presents the robustness tests of the main analysis of fund debt holdings on voting as in 
model 2 of Table 3 Panel A. Panel A shows the results using alternative measures of financial 
distress: industry distress and debt rating. First, we define distress (0,1) to be one if the three digit SIC 
industry a firm is in is experiencing financial distress in that year, and zero otherwise. Based on Opler 
and Titman (1994), a three digit SIC code industry is in financial distress if the median sales growth is 
negative and the median stock return is below -30%. Second, we define distress (0,1) to be one if the 
firm’s debt rating is CCC and below in the year concerned, and zero otherwise. Panel B shows the 
results using the fraction of funds that hold debt in a fund family to measure the average importance 
of debt for fund families. We calculate the value of equity vs debt owned by each fund in each year 
across all firms to categorize each fund into debt, equity, or mixed. If the fund owns at least 95% of its 
holding as debt (equity) then we classify it as a debt (equity) fund. Debt fraction at the family level for 
debt and mixed funds (debt funds) is the proportion of the number of debt and mixed funds (debt 
funds) in the total number of funds in the family. Panel C shows the results when we include only 
fund families holding both debt and equity in a particular year. Panel D shows the results when we 
exclude firms in the financial industry (with four digit SIC codes starting with 6). Panel E shows the 
results when we exclude funds holding credit default swap contracts. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Alternative measures of financial distress 
Regression coefficient and  
p-value for Family debt fraction 
× Distress (0,1) 
Industry in distress  
 
Debt rating 
 N Coefficient p-value  N Coefficient p-value 
Vote with creditors (0,1) 61,345 0.1998** 0.0307 40,443 0.1534** 0.0102 
 
Panel B: Using the proportion of the number of debt funds in the family as debt fraction 
Summary statistics  Debt and mixed funds  Debt funds 
  N Mean [Median]  N 
Mean 
[Median] 
Family debt fraction    52,745 0.0483 [0.0000] 
52,745 0.0123 
[0.0000] 
Family debt fraction conditional 
on family debt holding 
 7,589 0.3389 
[0.2500] 
2,803 0.2335 
[0.2000] 
      
Regression coefficient and p-value for  
Family debt fraction × Distress (0,1) Debt and mixed funds  Debt funds only 
 N Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Vote with creditors (0,1) 52,745 0.1504** 0.0407 0.1696** 0.0224 
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Panel C: Including only fund families holding both debt and equity in the firm 
Summary statistics  N Mean [Median] 
Family debt fraction   7,136 0.2945 
[0.1489] 
Regression coefficient and p-value for  
Family debt fraction × Distress (0,1) 
 
  
 N Coefficient p-value 
Vote with creditors (0,1) 7,136 0.1927** 0.0124 
 
 
Panel D: Excluding financial companies 
Summary statistics  N Mean [Median] 
Family debt fraction    42,681 0.0390 
[0.0000] 
Family debt fraction conditional on family debt holding  5,586 0.2978 
[0.1509] 
Regression coefficient and p-value for  
Family debt fraction × Distress (0,1) 
 
  
 N Coefficient p-value 
Vote with creditors (0,1) 42,681 0.2092*** 0.0015 
 
Panel E: Excluding funds with credit default swap  
Summary statistics  N Mean [Median] 
Family debt fraction    52,745 0.0326 
[0.0000] 
Family debt fraction conditional on family debt holding  6,307 0.2749 
[0.1307] 
Regression coefficient and p-value for  
Family debt fraction × Distress (0,1) 
 
  
 N Coefficient p-value 
Vote with creditors (0,1) 52,745 0.1734** 0.0265 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
Family level variables  
Family debt fraction the sum of investment in bonds across all funds of the family in a 
firm in a year divided by the sum of investment in bonds and 
equity across all funds of the family in the firm in the year 
Big holding (0,1) one if the investment of the fund family in the firm concerned is 
above the size of its 75th percentile investment in the year 
concerned and zero otherwise 
Number of funds  the logarithm of the number of individual funds owned by the fund 
family 
  
Firm level variables  
Value weighted debt 
fraction 
the value weighted debt fraction by all families in a firm in a year 
with the weight being family’s investment (sum of both debt and 
equity) in the firm. Debt fraction at the family level is the 
proportion of investment in bonds in total investment in bonds and 
equity for all funds in the family. 
Distress (0,1) one if the firm’s default probability is at least 75% in the year 
concerned and zero otherwise. We measure a firm’s default 
probability using the distance to default proposed by Bharath and 
Shumway (2008).  
Firm size the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
(PRCC_F×CSHO) 
Market-to-book the market value of assets (PRCC_F×CSHO) divided by the book 
value of assets (AT) 
Leverage the book value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by the sum of book 
value of debt and market value of equity (DLTT + DLC + 
PRCC_F×CSHO) 
ROA the operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) divided by the 
beginning book value of assets (AT) 
Firm age the number of years since the IPO date (or the first CRSP date if IPO 
date is missing) 
Institutional block 
ownership 
the total number of shares owned by all institutional blockholders (at 
least 5% ownership in the firm) on the firm’s total shares 
outstanding 
Fraction of votes in the 
interest of creditors 
we calculate first the fraction of votes in the interest of creditors for 
each fund family across each conflict proposal category, then 
average the fraction of votes in the interest of creditors for each 
fund family across all conflict proposal categories, and finally 
calculate an equity-value weighted average fraction of votes in the 
interest of creditors across fund families in a firm in a given year 
Capital expenditure capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by total assets (AT) (set to zero 
if missing) 
SEOs proceeds from seasoned equity offering (from SDC) divided by total 
assets (AT) (set to zero if missing) 
Non-core M&As one if the firm make a non-core acquisition (in which the target 
and the acquirer are not in the same two digit SIC) and zero 
otherwise 
Dividends dividends (DVT) divided by total assets (AT) (set to zero if missing) 
Repurchases  share repurchase (PRSTKC) scaled by total assets (AT) (set to zero 
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if missing) 
 
Vote level variables  
Vote in the interest of 
creditors (0,1) 
one if a given fund family cast more than 50% of the votes of its 
funds in favor of creditors for the conflict proposal concerned in 
which there is a conflict of interest between debt holders and 
equity holders, and zero otherwise  
ISS voting in the interest of 
creditors (0,1) 
one if the voting recommendation by ISS on a proposal is in the 
interest of creditors, and zero otherwise 
  
 
 
 
